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INTRODUCTION
In 2018 alone, the United States federal government announced
that nearly 3,000 children were forcibly separated from their parents
upon crossing the southern border as a result of the Trump Adminis-
tration’s “zero tolerance” policy and the subsequent increase in immi-
gration detention at the border.1 This number is only an estimate,
however, due to the lack of an integrated data system to effectively
record and track the families separated by the government.2 More-
over, countless children forcibly torn apart from their families by
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would never even be
included in this system, should it exist.3 According to the federal gov-
ernment, these families, consisting of minor children accompanied
by an adult relative who is not their biological parent or legal guard-
ian, could never be truly separated because they are not families at
all.4 Rather, any child crossing the border without a parent or legal
guardian is defined by statute as “unaccompanied.”5
One of the most pivotal lawsuits addressing family unity in im-
migration, as well as the detention conditions of minors within gov-
ernment custody, is Reno v. Flores from 1993.6 The plaintiffs in the
suit, all minors held in Immigration and Naturalization Service’s
(INS) custody, built a majority of their case on the argument that INS’
release policy violated both substantive and procedural due process
under the Fourteenth and Fifth Amendments.7 Although the Supreme
1. Miriam Jordan, Family Separation May Have Hit Thousands More Migrant Chil-
dren Than Reported, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/17/us
/family-separation-trump-administration-migrants.html [https://perma.cc/5SZ5-F5AS].
The zero tolerance policy came into effect in early summer of 2018 and was promoted by
Attorney General Jeff Sessions. Attorney General Jefferson Sessions, Remarks Discussing
the Immigration Enforcement Actions of the Trump Administration (May 7, 2018), https://
www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-discussing-im
migration-enforcement-actions [https://perma.cc/E5YZ-RQU5] (“I have put in place a ‘zero
tolerance’ policy for illegal entry on our Southwest border. If you cross this border unlaw-
fully, then we will prosecute you. It’s that simple.”).
2. Jordan, supra note 1.
3. See AMNESTY INT’L, USA: ‘YOU DON’T HAVE ANY RIGHTS HERE’: ILLEGAL PUSHBACKS,
ARBITRARY DETENTION & ILL TREATMENT OF ASYLUM SEEKERS IN THE UNITED STATES 43
(2018), https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AMR5191012018ENGLISH.PDF.
4. Id.
5. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).
6. See generally Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993).
7. See id. at 299–300. Various federal courts have acknowledged that immigrants
detained at the border, including unaccompanied minors, are afforded procedural due
process rights both under the Constitution and through legislation such as the William
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act. See Saravia v. Sessions,
280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1194 (N.D. Cal. 2017) (“[I]t is clear, notwithstanding the govern-
ment’s argument to the contrary, that [unaccompanied] minors like A.H. have procedural
due process rights rooted in the Constitution.”); F.L.B. v. Lynch, 180 F. Supp. 3d 811, 820
(W.D. Wash. 2016) (“The question the Court faces in this case is not whether plaintiffs
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Court did not rule favorably on the plaintiffs’ constitutional claims,
the subsequent litigation based on the resulting settlement, the cur-
rent political and social climate regarding immigration, and recent
federal immigration jurisprudence all indicate that a challenge could
be made regarding the constitutionality of 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2)—the
statute that defines unaccompanied minors—and its interpretation
and enforcement by the government.8
This Note will examine some of the legal arguments surrounding
the issue of family unity in immigration detention and how justice can
be sought for the minors wrongfully classified by the government as
“unaccompanied.” I posit that the government’s classification of minors
traveling in nonparental family units as “unaccompanied” pursuant
to 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) unconstitutionally deprives these minors of
their judicially recognized substantive due process right of family
unity.9 Like minors who arrive at the border in the company of their
parents or legal guardians, these minors should be classified as
accompanied and placed in family detention centers with their accom-
panying nonparental adult family members.10
First, this Note will outline the legal definition of “unaccompa-
nied minor” according to federal statute. Part II of this Note will
contextualize this legal debate by examining the foundational Flores
v. Reno case, the constitutional arguments posed by the class of
detained minors, and the Supreme Court’s response. Additionally,
this Note will discuss the impact that Flores and the subsequent
Flores Settlement have had on the current system of immigration
detention for minor children and elaborate on how unaccompanied
and accompanied minors fit within the Flores framework. Part III
will analyze the application of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments generally in immigration case law, focusing on the differentia-
tion made between noncitizen residents and noncitizens detained upon
arrival at the border. Part IV will explore the potential of expanding
the constitutional rights of unaccompanied minors in immigration
detention in light of recent cases such as Garza v. Hargan. Finally,
[non-admitted aliens] have procedural due process rights. Clearly they do. The question
is what procedural rights are due to plaintiffs.”) (emphasis added).
8. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).
9. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977). Although Moore spe-
cifically defines the right of extended family members outside of the nuclear family to
reside together in a household, I argue that it can be properly analogized and applied to
family unity in the immigration context. See discussion infra Section V.B.
10. This Note is by no means postulating that family detention centers are a sufficient
solution for family separation. For just a few of the reasons why family immigration
detention is harmful, see, for example, John Burnett, The U.S. Has A Long, Troubled
History of Detaining Families Together, NPR (June 29, 2018, 9:10 PM), https://www.npr
.org/2018/06/29/624789871/president-trumps-new-plan-isnt-to-separate-migrant-families
-but-to-lock-them-up [https://perma.cc/4Y8R-ZGSM].
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Part V will outline a possible constitutional challenge that could be
brought against 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) and what this successful chal-
lenge could mean for the preservation of family unity within the
Flores framework.
I. WHO ARE UNACCOMPANIED MINORS?11
A. Statutory Definitions and Rights
In the 2018 fiscal year, over 50,000 unaccompanied minors were
apprehended at the southwest border by U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CPB).12 The majority of the United States’ immigration
policy regarding unaccompanied minors is governed by the Homeland
Security Act (HSA) of 2002 and the William Wilberforce Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA) of 2008.13 The HSA
provides, among several other changes to previous immigration pro-
cedures,14 the statutory definition for unaccompanied minors that
is used for all related legislation:
the term “unaccompanied alien child” means a child who—(A)
has no lawful immigration status in the United States; (B) has
not attained 18 years of age; and (C) with respect to whom—(i)
there is no parent or legal guardian in the United States; or (ii)
no parent or legal guardian in the United States is available to
provide care and physical custody.15
A memorandum from the United States Citizenship and Immigration
Services’ (USCIS) Asylum Division further expounded this definition.16
11. Referred to in relevant legislation as “unaccompanied alien children” or “UAC.”
6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).
12. Southwest Border Migration FY2018, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration/fy-2018 [https://perma.cc/6MSA
-CXWW] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
13. WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43599, UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN
CHILDREN: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2017).
14. The HSA fundamentally altered how unaccompanied minors were administratively
processed by the government. The processing and treatment of unaccompanied minors
became split between the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department
of Health and Human Service (HHS). Id. at 4. The DHS was given control over “the appre-
hension, transfer, and repatriation” of unaccompanied minors, while HHS’s Office of
Refugee Resettlement (ORR) was granted the responsibility of “coordinating and imple-
menting the care and placement of UAC in appropriate custody, reunifying UAC with their
parents abroad if appropriate, maintaining and publishing a list of legal services available
to UAC, and collecting statistical information on UAC, among other responsibilities.” Id.
15. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2) (emphasis added).
16. Section 235(d)(7)(B) of the TVPRA grants USCIS “initial jurisdiction over any
asylum application filed by” an unaccompanied minor. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION
SERV., MEMORANDUM: IMPLEMENTATION OF STATUTORY CHANGE PROVIDING USCIS WITH
INITIAL JURISDICTION OVER ASYLUM APPLICATIONS FILED BY UNACCOMPANIED ALIEN
CHILDREN (2009), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Memoranda/Static
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In confirming a child’s unaccompanied status pursuant to 6 U.S.C.
§ 279, “[a] child is unaccompanied even if he or she is in the informal
care and physical custody of other adults, including family members.”17
Given the narrow language of the statute and the subsequent guid-
ance, it is clear that the government’s definition of family is restricted
to that of the nuclear family.
Several years after the HSA, Congress implemented the TVPRA
to further govern the rights of unaccompanied minors apprehended
at the border while seeking asylum.18 The TVPRA specifies how DHS
and HHS should screen, process, and place into government custody
unaccompanied minors depending on whether they are nationals of
contiguous (Mexico and Canada) or noncontiguous countries.19
B. Statutory Definitions in Practice: “Accompanied” Unaccompanied
Minors and Family Separation
Because of the strict statutory definition requiring children to
be accompanied by a biological or legal parent, children who travel
in units with other adult family members will be classified by the
DHS as unaccompanied for the purposes of administrative process-
ing and detention.20 The legal classification of these children as
unaccompanied significantly changes how these minors make their
way through the immigration system, especially in the context of
family separation.21
In a recent report from Amnesty International on the detention
and treatment of asylum-seekers in the United States, the organiza-
tion decried CBP’s continuing practice of separating families on the
basis of “fraud” when children travel in nonparental family units.22
According to this report, families that CBP separated due to “fraud”
included: “(1) grandparents and others who ‘do not fit the definition
of immediate family member’; (2) those whose birth certificates and
-Files-Memoranda/2009/uac-filings-5f25mar09.pdf [hereinafter U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMI-
GRATION SERV. MEMO].
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. KANDEL, supra note 13, at 4. Sections of the TVPRA relevant to unaccompanied
minors are codified under 8 U.S.C. § 1232.
19. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(2), with 8 U.S.C. § 1232(a)(3). For more information
on the placement of unaccompanied minors within the new immigration framework, see
Wendy Shea, Almost There: Unaccompanied Alien Children, Immigration Reform, and
a Meaningful Opportunity to Participate in the Immigration Process, 18 UC DAVIS J. JUV.
L. & POL’Y 148 (2014).
20. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV. MEMO, supra note 16; WOMEN’S REFUGEE
COMM’N ET AL., BETRAYING FAMILY VALUES: HOW IMMIGRATION POLICY AT THE UNITED
STATES BORDER IS SEPARATING FAMILIES 5 (2017), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc/KIND%20-%20Betraying%20Family%20Values.pdf [hereinafter BETRAYING
FAMILY VALUES].
21. See generally BETRAYING FAMILY VALUES, supra note 20.
22. AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 3, at 43–44.
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other documents CBP could not verify through consulates; and (3)
those who were otherwise unable to prove their family relationships.”23
Since these separations are classified as the result of “fraudu-
lent” relationships, CBP does not include these families in their public
records documenting family separation.24 Not only are these family
separations not publicized to the same extent as are the cases of
parental separation, but many of the legal remedies currently avail-
able to parents and children who have been separated from each other
are not similarly available to separated members of nonparental
family units.25 Many of these remedies derive from the Flores litiga-
tion of the past three decades, which began after the initial case
reached the Supreme Court in 1993.26
II. FLORES V. RENO AND THE FLORES SETTLEMENT: A
FOUNDATIONAL CASE FOR THE RIGHTS OF UNACCOMPANIED MINORS
A. Initial Lawsuit
In 1985, four plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit challenging
both the release policy of the INS facilities where members of the class
were detained and the conditions of their detention within the facili-
ties.27 The named representative in the suit was unaccompanied
fifteen-year-old Jenny Lisette Flores.28 She arrived at the United
States border in 1985 after escaping the violent civil war in her home
country of El Salvador.29 Flores was detained in an INS facility in
Pasadena, California for two months prior to her deportation hearing,
and while in INS detention Flores was given limited recreational op-
portunities and the facility offered no educational programs.30 Flores
and other members of the class were forced to share bathrooms and
sleeping areas with unrelated adults of different genders.31 The class
members detained in the same facility in Pasadena as Flores were
also denied family visitation rights.32
23. Id. at 44.
24. Id. at 43.
25. See, e.g., Gamboa et al., infra note 85.
26. See discussion infra Section II.C.
27. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 296 (1993); see also Flores v. Meese, 934 F.2d 991,
993 (9th Cir. 1990).
28. Lisa Rodriguez Navarro, Comment, An Analysis of Treatment of Unaccompanied
Immigrant and Refugee Children in INS Detention and Other Forms of Institutionalized
Custody, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 589, 596 (1998).
29. Id.; Complaint at ¶ 28, Flores v. Meese, 934 F. 2d 991, 993 (9th Cir. 1990) (No.
85-4544-RJK(Px)) [hereinafter Flores Complaint].
30. Navarro, supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. Flores Complaint, supra note 29, ¶ 45.
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In addition to challenging the conditions of the facilities, the
plaintiff class brought constitutional and statutory claims against
the INS Western Regional Office’s policy of allowing the release of
unaccompanied minors only to “ ‘a parent or lawful guardian,’ except
in ‘unusual and extraordinary cases,’ when the juvenile could be
released to a ‘responsible individual who agrees to provide care and
can be responsible for the welfare and well being of the child.’ ”33 It
was this policy that prevented Flores from being reunited with her
aunt, a United States citizen residing in Southern California.34 This
policy also prevented Dominga Hernandez-Hernandez, another named
plaintiff in the suit, from being released into the custody of her adult
brother, Deomedes, who had been with Dominga at the time of their
arrest at the border but was separated from Dominga and later re-
leased on bail without her.35
In reaction to the district court’s decision to grant partial sum-
mary judgment on the plaintiffs’ equal protection claim,36 the INS
adopted an updated release policy for juvenile aliens in deportation
and exclusion proceedings.37 The new policy expanded the list of
adults to whom unaccompanied minors could be released from INS
detention, now including “(i) a parent; (ii) a legal guardian; or (iii) an
adult relative (brother, sister, aunt, uncle, grandparent) who are [sic]
not presently in INS detention.”38 Although the new regulation in-
creased the chances for unaccompanied minors to be released on bail
to family members and highlighted the importance of relationships
beyond the nuclear family, the plaintiffs continued to challenge the
policy’s constitutionality until the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Reno v. Flores.39
B. The Supreme Court’s Decision in Reno v. Flores
One of the key issues in the subsequent appeals was the plain-
tiffs’ claim that the new INS release policy facially violated the
substantive and procedural elements of the due process clause and
33. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 296 (1993).
34. Navarro, supra note 28.
35. Flores Complaint, supra note 29, ¶ 34.
36. Reno, 507 U.S. at 296–97 (1993) (The District Court granted partial summary
judgment on the claim that “the INS had no rational basis for treating alien minors in
deportation proceedings differently from alien minors in exclusion proceedings . . .
prompt[ing] the INS to initiate notice-and-comment rulemaking . . . ‘to provide a single
policy for juveniles in both deportation and exclusion proceedings’ ”).
37. Id. at 297.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 299. The District Court in Meese had granted summary judgement to the
plaintiff class on “due process grounds,” which was reversed by a panel of the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals. Id. Upon rehearing, the court vacated the panel’s opinion and
reinstated the District Court’s order. Id.
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the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.40 Respon-
dents claimed that “alien juveniles suspected of being deportable have
a ‘fundamental’ right to ‘freedom from physical restraint’ ” and that the
INS release policy violated their substantive due process rights.41
They also alleged that the release policy violated the Fifth Amend-
ment’s equal protection guarantee “because of the disparate treat-
ment evident in (1) releasing alien juveniles with close relatives or
legal guardians but detaining those without, and (2) releasing to
unrelated adults juveniles detained pending federal delinquency
proceedings . . . but detaining unaccompanied alien juveniles pend-
ing deportation proceedings.”42 Additionally, the respondents argued
that the policy violated procedural due process, “because it does not
require the Service to determine, with regard to each individual de-
tained juvenile who lacks an approved custodian, whether his best
interests lie in remaining in INS custody or in release to some other
‘responsible adult.’ ”43
In a 7–2 opinion penned by Justice Scalia, the Supreme Court
rejected these challenges to the INS release policy and found the
regulations to be within the bounds of the Constitution.44 According
to Justice Scalia, the unaccompanied minors did not have a funda-
mental right to “freedom from physical restraint” as defined by the
Court, and neither were they unconstitutionally discriminated against
on the basis of alienage.45 Nor were the unaccompanied minors de-
prived of procedural due process so long as they had the right to a
hearing before an immigration judge, regardless of whether this right
was exercised.46
1. Flores’ Substantive Due Process Claim
First, the Court addressed the respondents’ substantive due
process claim.47 The Court found that unaccompanied minors in INS
detention have no fundamental right to “freedom from physical
restraint” for several reasons.48 According to the Court, minors in
40. See Meese, 934 F.2d at 995; Reno, 507 U.S. at 299–300.
41. Reno, 507 U.S. at 299–300.
42. Id. at 306 (referencing 18 U.S.C. § 5034).
43. Id. at 300 (emphasis in original).
44. Id. at 315.
45. Id. at 302–04, 306.
46. Id. at 309.
47. Reno, 507 U.S. at 301–02. Prior to discussing the respondents’ constitutional claims,
the Court chose to ignore the claims regarding the conditions at juvenile detention centers.
Id. at 301.
48. Id. at 302–04. In his dissent, Justice Stevens argued that “[t]he right at stake in
this case is not the right of detained juveniles to be released to one particular custodian
rather than another, but the right not to be detained in the first place.” Id. at 341 (emphasis
in original). He found this right to be fundamental under the Constitution according to
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immigration detention were not restrained “in the sense of shackles,
chains, or barred cells,” nor deprived “of a right to come and go at
will” due to their status as juveniles, who are always under someone
else’s custody either by their parents, legal guardians, or the govern-
ment.49 As such, the right could not be considered “so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamen-
tal.”50 The Court feared that finding a fundamental right for chil-
dren to be in a noncustodial setting could be dangerously broad if
also applied in the context of government’s role in settings such as
state orphanages and similar childcare institutions.51 Of note is the
Court’s emphasis that the government, in detaining children in
these facilities, was not intending to “punish” the children as the
conditions of their custody were “decent and humane.”52 The pur-
portedly nonpunitive nature of immigration detention and the gov-
ernment’s interest in promoting the welfare of unaccompanied
minors gave the government a rational basis to essentially incarcer-
ate these children indefinitely without triggering the constitutional
protections of due process that would arise from the enforcement of
punitive measures.53
Furthermore, the Court noted that even if there was merit to
the respondents’ challenge to the constitutionality of the institu-
tional custody of unaccompanied minors, “the responsibility for reg-
ulating the relationship between the United States and our alien
visitors has been committed to the political branches of the Federal
Government.”54 Under federal statute granting discretion to determine
release pending deportation to the Attorney General, there is no
presumption of release pending deportation proceedings.55 However,
past Supreme Court precedent, and that the INS release policy was not narrowly tailored
enough to withstand higher scrutiny. Id. at 341–43.
49. Id. at 302.
50. Reno, 507 U.S. at 303 (internal quotations omitted).
51. Id. at 302–03.
52. Id. at 303.
53. Id. (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766 (1982)). In immigration-related
jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has recognized since the nineteenth century that the
imposition of a “punishment” comes with the due process constitutional protections asso-
ciated with deprivations of life, liberty, or property; see Fong Yue Ting v. United States,
149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). I would argue that the forced separation of children from their
family members, with the lifelong impacts that accompany such a separation, constitutes
a punishment that should allow for protections under the Constitution.
54. Reno, 507 U.S. at 305 (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976)).
55. Id. at 306. The Court is referencing 8 U.S.C.S. § 1252. Id. Respondents argued
that the release policy exceeded the Attorney General’s authority under this regulation.
Id. at 300. The relevant language provided:
[A]ny such alien taken into custody may, in the discretion of the Attorney Gen-
eral and pending such final determination of deportability, (A) be continued
in custody; or (B) be released under bond . . . containing such conditions as
the Attorney General may prescribe; or (C) be released on conditional parole.
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this does not mean that unaccompanied minors have no constitu-
tional rights.56 The government is still required to provide a rational
basis for their immigration policies, although this does not appear
to be a difficult bar for the government to overcome.57
2. Flores’ Equal Protection Claim
Second, the Court similarly struck down the respondents’ argu-
ment that the release policy violated the Fifth Amendment’s equal
protection guarantee based on their status as aliens.58 The Court
dismissed the equal protection claim because “the disparate treat-
ment evident in (1) releasing alien juveniles with close relatives or
legal guardians but detaining those without, and (2) releasing to
unrelated adults juveniles detained pending federal delinquency pro-
ceedings . . . but detaining unaccompanied alien juveniles pending
deportation proceedings” was allowable on the basis that, in the first
instance, there is a tradition in granting custody to close relatives,
and “the difference between citizens and aliens is adequate to sup-
port the [second instance].”59
3. Flores’ Procedural Due Process Claim60
Finally, the Court turned to the respondents’ argument that the
release policy deprived the class of procedural due process because
the policy did not require an individual determination that each child
But such bond or parole . . . may be revoked at any time by the Attorney
General, in his discretion . . . .
Id. at 295 n.1. This section of the United States Code was amended by the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, and similar provisions can
now be found in other sections of the Code. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226.
56. Reno, 507 U.S. at 306 (“[T]he INS regulation must still meet the (unexacting) stan-
dard of rationally advancing some legitimate governmental purpose—which it does . . . .”).
For an example of federal courts recognizing the constitutional rights of unaccompanied
minors, see Perez-Funez v. District Director, Immigration & Naturalization Service, 619
F. Supp. 656 (1985) (“Unaccompanied alien children possess substantial constitutional and
statutory rights. These rights exist in spite of the minors’ illegal entry into the country.”)
(internal quotations omitted).
57. Reno, 507 U.S. at 306.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Procedural due process describes the constitutionally appropriate legal process
that the government must follow when “depriv[ing] individuals of ‘liberty’ or ‘property’
interests within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amend-
ment.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). This is in contrast to “substantive
due process,” an element also found within the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
“which forbids the government to infringe certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests at all,
no matter what process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve
a compelling state interest.” Reno, 507 U.S. at 301–02.
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would be better served in INS custody than released to a “responsi-
ble adult.”61 The Court considered this argument to be a repackaged
substantive due process claim and likewise rejected it.62 The Court
found that unaccompanied minors received the procedural due pro-
cess to which they were entitled as they were given the right to a
hearing before an immigration judge, assuming that they were not
too young or too ignorant to understand the right when presented
as a written form and finding no evidence that the children experi-
enced excessive delays in receiving these hearings.63
C. The Flores Settlement and Aftermath
Upon being remanded by the Supreme Court, the plaintiff class
and the government agreed on a settlement in 1997 which “set . . .
out nationwide policy for the detention, release, and treatment of
minors in the custody of the INS.”64 The Flores Settlement focuses
on the quality of life of unaccompanied minors in immigration de-
tention centers and the procedures involving their arrest, placement,
and release.65 The language of the Flores Settlement favors family re-
unification and “creates a presumption in favor of releasing minors
and requires placement of those not released in licensed, non-secure
facilities that meet certain standards.”66 The Flores Settlement also
established standards of care for minors in immigration detention,
which included regulations on “food, clothing, grooming items,
medical and dental care, individualized needs assessments, educa-
tional services, recreation and leisure time, counseling, access to
religious services, contact with family members, and a reasonable
right to privacy.”67
Even after the government voluntarily entered into the settle-
ment agreement, the litigation has continued as the INS and its
successors in immigration enforcement, the Department of Home-
land Security (DHS) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement
61. Reno, 507 U.S. at 308.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 309.
64. Flores v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 898, 901 (2016) (internal quotations omitted).
65. Stipulated Settlement Agreement at ¶ 9, Flores v. Reno, No. CV 85-4544-RJK(Px)
(C.D. Cal. Jan 17, 1997), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/flores_set
tlement_final_plus_extension_of_settlement011797.pdf [hereinafter Flores Settlement].
66. Lynch, 828 F.3d at 901; see also Flores Settlement, supra note 65, ¶¶ 14, 18 (“INS
shall release a minor from its custody without unnecessary delay . . . to: A. a parent; B. a
legal guardian; C. an adult relative . . . . [T]he INS . . . shall make . . . prompt and
continuous efforts . . . toward family reunification and the release of the minor . . . .”)
(emphasis added).
67. Lynch, 828 F.3d at 903.
202 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:191
(ICE),68 repeatedly fail to perform their obligations under the Flores
Settlement.69 One of the most significant takeaways following Flores
comes from Flores v. Lynch, which held that the Flores Settlement
applies to all minors in the custody of immigration authorities, both
unaccompanied and accompanied.70 This round of litigation arose in
the context of a changing political landscape in which immigration
enforcement became stricter and fewer families were released on
bail.71 In the 2000s, DHS began converting prisons into family de-
tention facilities and incarcerating families indefinitely pending
removal proceedings.72 Flores challenged the government’s new no-
release policy as to Central American families and the confinement
of immigrant children in these secure, unlicensed family detention
centers as violations of the Flores Settlement.73 The government de-
fended their decision to indefinitely detain families in light of the
“surge in family units crossing the Southwest border,” an argument
which the court found to be an unsatisfactory reason to amend the
terms of the Flores Settlement.74 The Ninth Circuit held that the
Flores Settlement applied equally to the minors detained with their
parents in these facilities, although it did not require the release of
their parents.75
D. Flores Today and Its Application to the Family Separation
Crisis at the Southern Border
Unfortunately, while the Flores Settlement is designed to pro-
mote family unity during immigration proceedings, it has never been
fully incorporated as federal regulation.76 The Flores Settlement was
68. DHS and ICE are held to the same standards as the INS under the Flores
Settlement. Bunikyte v. Chertoff, Nos. A-07-CA-164-SS, A-07-CA-165-SS, A-07-CA-166
-SS, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26166, at *8 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 9, 2007) (“The Flores settlement
is binding on ICE and DHS as successor organizations to INS.”).
69. On July 9, 2018, Judge Gee issued an order denying the government limited relief
to allow “an exemption from the Flores Agreement’s release provisions so that [ICE] may
detain alien minors who have arrived with their parent or legal guardian together in ICE
family residential facilities . . . .” Flores v. Sessions, No. CV 85-4544-DMG (AGRx), 2018
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115488, at *3 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2018).
70. Lynch, 828 F.3d at 901.
71. Id. at 903.
72. Id. at 904. The court notes that the family detention centers recently opened by
ICE operate under ICE’s “Family Residential Detention Standards” and do not comply
with the terms of the Flores Settlement.
73. Id. at 904–05.
74. Id. at 910.
75. Id.
76. United States v. Dominguez-Portillo, No. EP-17-MJ-4409-MAT, 2018 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2660 at *18 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2018). In 2008, parts of the Flores Settlement were
codified by the enactment of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victim Protection
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merely intended to serve as a temporary framework until the gov-
ernment passed final regulations that reflected the agreements in
the settlement.77 The government has yet to do so.78
Under the current Trump Administration, the government has
interpreted the Settlement and the ensuing litigation as justification
for their practice of family separation during the implementation of
a “zero tolerance” policy for offenses related to improper entry.79 A
key finding influencing this decision to separate families was the
establishment of twenty days as the standard limit for which minors
could be detained in a secure, non-licensed facility pursuant to Para-
graphs 12A and 14 of the Flores Settlement.80 After being separated
from their parents upon initial entry, these children are then classi-
fied as unaccompanied minors and given to HHS for detainment in
separate juvenile facilities while their parents remain in adult
immigration detention facilities in an attempt by the government to
circumvent the release presumptions in the Flores Settlement.81 The
Trump Administration’s policy of family separation continues to be
a topic of debate to this day.82
Reauthorization Act of 2008, which created “statutory standards for the treatment of
unaccompanied minors.” Lynch, 828 F.3d at 904.
77. Dominguez-Portillo, No. EP-17-MJ-4409-MAT, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2660 at *18.
78. Id. at *18–19 (quoting Bunikyte, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26166, at *9) (“[I]t ap-
pears that Flores is the only binding legal standard directly applicable to the detention
of minor aliens by the United States government, despite the passage of time and the
drastic changes in immigration policy since this judgment was first entered.”).
79. See Dara Lind & Dylan Scott, Flores Agreement: Trump’s Executive Order to End
Family Separation Might Run Afoul of a 1997 Court Ruling, VOX (June 20, 2018, 3:20
PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/6/20/17484546/executive-order-family-separation-flores
-settlement-agreement-immigration [https://perma.cc/ZG5M-6YBV]; see also Nila Bala &
Arthur Rizer, Trump’s Family Separation Policy Never Really Ended. This is Why., NBC
NEWS (July 1, 2019, 12:17 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/trump-s-family
-separation-policy-never-really-ended-why-ncna1025376 [https://perma.cc/DJL7-5GK6]
(“[T]he zero tolerance and family separation policies are distinct from each other. . . .
Child separation, though, is a direct result of zero tolerance, and cannot be ended without
truly ending zero tolerance.”).
80.  Flores v. Lynch, 212 F. Supp. 3d 907, 913–14 (C.D. Cal. 2015). The twenty-day
standard was recently reiterated when Judge Gee denied the government’s request to
permit the DHS to indefinitely detain families pursuant to President Trump’s Executive
Order No. 13841. Flores v. Sessions, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115488, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal.
July 9, 2018).
81. Nicholas Wu, House Report: Trump Administration’s ‘Zero Tolerance’ Immigration
Policy ‘Harmful, Traumatic and Chaotic,’ USA TODAY (July 12, 2019, 1:27 PM), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/07/12/immigration-house-report-toddlers-in
fants-separated-border/1712960001 [https://perma.cc/AWL6-YJBN]; see also Salvador
Rizzo, The Facts About Trump’s Policy of Separating Families at the Border, WASH. POST
(June 19, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/06/19/the
-facts-about-trumps-policy-of-separating-families-at-the-border/?utm_term=.9fc68c9f
42be [https://perma.cc/E5GX-HFVH].
82. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 81.
204 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:191
Children at the border are still repeatedly subjected to the devas-
tating effects of being separated from their families and caretakers,
and more information about the extent of this harm continues to be
unearthed.83 However, most of the recent cases brought against the
government, as well as the majority of media reports surrounding the
ongoing family separation crisis along the Mexican border, are cen-
tered on the narrative of children being separated from their biologi-
cal parents.84 These reports often ignore the equal harm to children
who immigrate with and are separated from other adult relatives
who are not their legal or biological parents, such as aunts, uncles,
siblings, cousins, and grandparents.85 CBP has openly stated that,
both before the implementation of the zero tolerance policy and in
the aftermath of the public outrage surrounding family separation,
the separations of nonparental family units are not considered to be
true family separations but are instead categorized under allegations
of fraud.86 The Trump Administration defends this classification as
part of their larger justification for family separations in general by
83. See Catherine E. Shoichet, The US Just Revealed More Families Were Separated.
Here’s Why that Matters, CNN (Oct. 26, 2018, 10:19 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/10
/26/politics/separated-families-reunification-update/index.html [https://perma.cc/4WZV
-7L3Q]; BETRAYING FAMILY VALUES, supra note 20, at 12–14.
84. See, e.g., L. v. United States Immigration & Customs Enf’t (“ICE”), 310 F. Supp. 3d
1133, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (enjoining government defendants “from detaining [adult par-
ents detained in immigration custody by the DHS who have a minor child separated from
them by DHS] in DHS custody without and apart from their minor children . . .”).
Additionally, Trump’s Executive Order 13841, which was announced to bring an end to
the family separation policy after his Administration faced intense public backlash, de-
fines an “alien child” for the purposes of describing family separation as a minor with “a
legal parent-child relationship to an alien who entered the United States with the alien
child . . . .” Exec. Order No. 13841, 83 Fed. Reg. 122 (June 25, 2018). Prior to the executive
order, the Keep Families Together Act, introduced in the Senate on June 7, 2018 by
Senator Dianne Feinstein, similarly focused only on relationships between children and
parents or legal guardians. Press Release, Dianne Feinstein, Feinstein, Colleagues Intro-
duce Legislation to Halt Separation of Immigrant Families (June 8, 2018), https://www
.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/6/feinstein-colleagues-introduce-legislation
-to-halt-separation-of-immigrant-families [https://perma.cc/NA2W-DESP].
85. See Suzanne Gamboa, et al., Migrant Children, Parents Still Separated After
Reunifications Ask, ‘What About Me?,’ NBC NEWS (July 31, 2018), https://www.nbcnews
.com/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/migrant-children-parents-still-separated-after
-reunifications-ask-what-about-n895946 [https://perma.cc/C24G-4TR6] (“Some relatives
who arrived with children—aunts, uncles, cousins, siblings, grandparents and others—
are not covered by the American Civil Liberties Union lawsuit which led to Sabraw’s
ruling, which only applies to adult parents, biological or otherwise, who arrived in the
U.S. with their child.”).
86. Dara Lind, Trump Is Separating an Unknown Number of Families at the Border
For ‘Fraud,’ VOX (Oct. 12, 2018, 11:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/2018/10/11/17963380
/family-separation-news-still-children [https://perma.cc/S98C-Z69G]; AMNESTY INT’L, supra
note 3, at 6 (“Those statistics [released by CBP on the number of family units separated
in 2017 and 2018] still seemed to omit hundreds—if not thousands—of families separated
at official ports-of-entry, or with non-parental relationships (including grandparents,
among others).”).
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inaccurately emphasizing unfounded fears that these family units
are “fraudulently trafficking children” to receive more favorable rul-
ings in immigration proceedings.87 With the government’s broad
discretion to separate nonparental family units and the lack of atten-
tion and accountability placed on DHS for these separations, it
seems unlikely that the children separated in this manner will receive
any legal remedies. As long as these children can continue to be clas-
sified as “unaccompanied minors” under federal immigration regula-
tions88 and separated on the basis of fraud, there seems to be little
recourse for them under the Flores Settlement.89 As this Note will go
on to suggest, however, these misclassified minors may be able to
find relief under the Constitution.
III. THE CONSTITUTION AT THE BORDER
The Supreme Court’s decision in Reno emphasized how difficult
it can be for undocumented immigrants detained at their time of entry
to receive protection under the U.S. Constitution.90 Although the Court
entertained the respondent class’s constitutional claims, the Court’s
decision imposed high hurdles that the respondents failed to over-
come.91 Due to the Court’s narrow definition of the right in question
and the classification of this right as nonfundamental,92 as well as
the significant deference to the legislature in matters of immigration,
the respondents’ substantive due process and Equal Protection Clause
claims were ultimately rejected.93 Yet, unlawful immigration status
does not always preclude constitutional challenges.94
87. Kirstjen Nielsen, the former Secretary of Homeland Security, has repeatedly spoken
about asylum fraud and used misleading statistics to indicate that fraud is a growing
threat to the safety of immigrant children. See Aaron Blake, Kirstjen Nielsen’s Mighty
Struggle to Explain Separating Families at the Border, Annotated, WASH. POST (June 19,
2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2018/06/19/kirstjen-nielsen-tries
-to-explain-separating-families-at-the-border-annotated [https://perma.cc/UAZ9-JHFG].
Nielsen also called for reforms of “major loopholes” in our current immigration system,
including reforms to TVPRA, to asylum laws that encourage the “systemic abuse of our
asylum system,” and to the Flores Settlement to allow for family detention. Id. See also
discussion infra Section V.B.
88. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).
89. See discussion supra Section II.D.
90. See discussion supra Section II.B.
91. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 315 (1993).
92. It is up to debate whether a different classification of the right would have led the
Court to apply strict scrutiny rather than rational basis, and if the regulation would
have survived a higher level of review. See Denise E. Choquette, Reno v. Flores and the
Supreme Court’s Continuing Trend Toward Narrowing Due Process Rights, 15 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 115, 122 (1995).
93. Reno, 507 U.S. at 305–06.
94. See generally Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
206 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:191
A. Constitutional Protections for Noncitizens Who Have Effected
Entry into the United States
1. Protection for Documented Noncitizen Residents: Yick Wo
v. Hopkins
The Supreme Court has often acknowledged that “[a]liens, even
aliens whose presence in this country is unlawful, have long been
recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed due process of law by the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments” when they are living within the bound-
aries of a state.95 This principle has survived in the judicial system
for over a hundred years since the foundational holding in Yick Wo
v. Hopkins.96 In Yick Wo, the Supreme Court considered the consti-
tutionality of the enforcement of an ordinance regulating the building
properties of laundries.97 The Court held that the imprisonment of
petitioners under the ordinance violated the Fourteenth Amend-
ment as the enforcement of the facially neutral ordinance arbi-
trarily, unfairly, and disproportionately targeted laundry owners of
Chinese race and nationality.98 In reaching this conclusion, the
Court recognized that the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment
are “not confined to the protection of citizens . . . . These provisions
are universal in their application, to all persons within the territo-
rial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color,
or of nationality; and the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of
the protection of equal laws.”99
2. Protection for Undocumented Noncitizen Residents in the
United States: Plyler v. Doe
The Supreme Court reaffirmed this interpretation of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments as it applies specifically to undocu-
mented immigrants without lawful entry in Plyler v. Doe.100 The Court
95. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 210 (holding that revisions to the Texas Education Code that
allowed school districts to deny enrollment in public schools to undocumented immigrant
children violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause); see also Mathews
v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976) (“Even one whose presence in this country is unlawful,
involuntary, or transitory is entitled to that constitutional protection [from deprivation
of life, liberty, or property without due process of law].”); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693
(“[O]nce an alien enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process
Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their
presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”).
96. 118 U.S. at 374.
97. Id. at 368.
98. Id. at 374.
99. Id. at 369.
100. 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982).
2019] THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMILY SEPARATION 207
struck down legislation in Texas that allowed public school districts
to deny enrollment to children not “legally admitted” to the United
States and allowed the state to withhold funds from school districts
that used these funds to educate undocumented students.101 In his
majority opinion, Justice Brenn an rejected the state ’s argument
that undocumented aliens were not “persons within the jurisdiction”
of Texas due to their immigration status.102 Reiterating the legal
analysis in Yick Wo, the Court found that “[w]hatever his status
under the immigration laws, an alien is surely a ‘person’ in any or-
dinary sense of that term. Aliens, even aliens whose presence in this
country is unlawful, have long been recognized as ‘persons’ guaranteed
due process of law by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.”103
After finding that undocumented immigrants were protected
under the Constitution, the Court then discussed whether the Texas
legislation violated the Equal Protection Clause.104 The Court has
“treated as presumptively invidious those classifications that disad-
vantage a ‘suspect class,’ or that impinge upon the exercise of a ‘fun-
damental right,’ ” after which the government must “demonstrate
that its classification has been precisely tailored to serve a compel-
ling governmental interest.”105 Certain classifications, although not
facially invidious, may still be subject to a higher level of scrutiny
than rational basis if they “give rise to recurring constitutional dif-
ficulties.”106 In those instances, the government must prove that the
legislative classification furthers a substantial state interest.107
In Plyler, the Court found that undocumented immigrants are not
a suspect class under traditional Equal Protection Clause analysis.108
Immigration status is not an immutable trait nor is it “irrelevant to
any proper legislative goal.”109 The children of undocumented immi-
grants, however, seem to be given at least some extra consideration.110
The children being disenfranchised by the legislation barring their
101. Id. at 205.
102. Id. at 210.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 216.
105. Id. at 216–17.
106. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 217.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 223.
109. Id. at 220. The Court does, however, acknowledge that the millions of undocu-
mented immigrants living in the United States “raises the specter of a permanent caste
of undocumented resident aliens . . . denied the benefits that our society makes available
to citizens and lawful residents. The existence of such an underclass presents most
difficult problems for a Nation that prides itself on adherence to principles of equality
under law.” Id. at 218–19.
110. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219–20 (“[C]hildren of those illegal entrants are not
comparably situated.”).
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education could “affect neither their parents’ conduct nor their own
status,”111 and “penalizing the . . . child is an ineffectual—as well as
unjust—way of deterring the parent.”112
Moreover, public education is not a fundamental or constitu-
tional right on which infringement upon would lead to the application
of a strict scrutiny standard.113 However, the Court recognized that,
because of the unique nature of education and the lasting effects that
it has on the development of children, laws that infringe upon the
right to education should receive a type of intermediate scrutiny.114
By depriving an entire class of the benefits of education, the legislation
irreparably and negatively impacts “the social, economic, intellectual,
and psychological well-being of the individual . . . . [These impacts]
and the obstacle [that the legislation] poses to individual achieve-
ment[ ] make it most difficult to reconcile the cost or the principle of
a status-based denial of basic education with the framework of
equality embodied in the Equal Protection Clause.”115 The Court’s
analysis underscored the long-term costs of this legislation on the
affected children and on the country as a whole:
Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of
children not accountable for their disabling status. The stigma
of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By denying
these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live
within the structure of our civic institutions, and foreclose any
realistic possibility that they will contribute in even the smallest
way to the progress of our Nation. In determining the rationality
of § 21.031, we may appropriately take into account its costs to
the Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims. In
light of these countervailing costs, the discrimination contained
in § 21.031 can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers
some substantial goal of the State.116
111. Id. at 220 (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 77 (1977)).
112. Id. (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
113. Id. at 221.
114. Id. at 221–23. The Court notes that “some degree of education is necessary to
prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system
if we are to preserve freedom and independence.” Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221. The Court “cannot
ignore the significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the
means to absorb the values and skills upon which our social order rests. Id.
115. Id. at 222. The Court also compared their findings in this case with their inter-
pretation of education in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Id. at 222–23.
116.  Id. at 223–24 (emphasis added). The Court also dismisses the State’s argument that
deference should be given to classifications of aliens based on Congress’ plenary power
over matters of immigration because the classification was made on a state level and “in
the absence of any contrary indication fairly discernible in the present legislative record,”
there is no national policy justification for supporting the classification. Id. at 224–26.
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Ultimately, the Court held that the State’s justifications for the
classification—to protect the State’s economy, to improve the State’s
quality of public education, and to better serve students who are
more likely to remain within the State—were not rationally related
to furthering a substantial state interest.117
B. Constitutional Protections, or Lack Thereof, for Noncitizens
Detained Prior to Effecting Entry: Case Precedents and Persuasive
Arguments from Jean v. Nelson
It is established case law that immigrants detained at the
border have fewer constitutional protections than immigrants who
have effected entry into the United States.118 One of the seminal
cases that helped to define this viewpoint is the Supreme Court’s
1953 decision in Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei.119 The
Court recognized that aliens who have entered our country’s borders,
regardless of their legal immigration status, are afforded due pro-
cess guarantees.120 However, “an alien on the threshold of initial entry
stands on a different footing [than aliens who have passed through
our gates, even illegally]: ‘Whatever the procedure authorized by
Congress is, it is due process as far as an alien denied entry is con-
cerned.’ ”121 This finding was extremely deferential to the Attorney
General’s delegated power in determining certain immigration mat-
ters, and the Court held that they were not authorized to review this
decision as a “determination of the political branch of the Govern-
ment.”122 Throughout the years, the federal judiciary has continued
this trend of skirting the issue of the constitutional protections of
immigrants detained at the border as a subject under the sole au-
thority of the legislative branch.123
117. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228–30.
118. See, e.g., Servin-Espinoza v. Ashcroft, 309 F.3d 1193, 1198 (9th Cir. 2002) (“Our
immigration law has generally treated aliens who are already on our soil (and who are
therefore deportable) more favorably than aliens who are merely seeking admittance
(and who are therefore excludable).”) (citing Alvarez-Mendez v. Stock, 941 F.2d 956, 962
(9th Cir. 1991)).
119. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 207 (1953) (deciding
“whether the Attorney General’s continued exclusion of respondent without a hearing
amounts to an unlawful detention . . .”).
120. Id. at 212.
121. Id. (quoting Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950)).
122. Id. at 212–16.
123. See, e.g., Castro v. United States Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir.
2016). The Third Circuit held that the District Court “lacked jurisdiction under [8 U.S.C.
§ 1252] to review Petitioners’ claims” and that Congress has “unambiguously limited the
scope of judicial review,” reinforcing Congress’ plenary power “over aliens at the border
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On the other hand, while not binding, persuasive arguments
have come from the Supreme Court indicating that cases like Mezei
and Knauff should not be interpreted to so severely limit the Consti-
tution’s reach to immigrants seeking entry.124 In Jean v. Nelson, a
class of Haitians alleged that INS’ parole policy violated the Fifth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause because it discriminated
against immigrants on the basis of race and national origin.125 In a
rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuit held that “the Fifth Amend-
ment did not apply to the consideration of unadmitted aliens for
parole” as it fell within the Attorney General’s discretionary authority
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A).126 The Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment for remand, although they noted that it was unnecessary
to address the Constitutional issue as the current statutes would
provide all the relief needed.127
In his dissent with Justice Brennan, Justice Marshall argued
that not only was it necessary for the court to rule on the constitu-
tional question at issue, but that the petitioners were protected from
discrimination on the basis of race or national origin under the Fifth
Amendment.128 He contended that the broad dicta of Mezei suggest-
ing that immigrants who have not effected entry at the border are
not protected by the Constitution “can withstand neither the weight
of logic nor that of principle, and has never been incorporated into
the fabric of our constitutional jurisprudence.”129 He reasoned that
if immigrants detained at the border are generally accepted by the
judicial system and the government to be entitled to due process
rights under the Fifth Amendment in cases of criminal prosecution,
it should follow that immigrants are protected in noncriminal cases
as well.130 Justice Marshall relied on the Court’s previous holdings
in cases such as Yick Wo, Plyler, and Mathews v. Diaz to justify his
seeking initial admission.” Id. at 434, 443, 450. The Court heavily relied on their prior
decisions in Knauff and Mezei. Id. at 442–44.
124. See Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 858–82 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
125. Id. at 849.
126. Id. at 852.
127. Id. at 854–57.
128. Id. at 858 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 869. Justice Marshall analyzes the dicta from cases such as Mezei, Knauff,
and Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953) and outlines the potential dangers
in reading these cases to hold that first-time entrants into the country are not “person[s]”
under the Constitution. Jean, 472 U.S. at 869–72. If immigrants detained at the border
have no protection under the Constitution, “the Attorney General, for example, could in-
voke legitimate immigration goals to justify a decision to stop feeding all detained aliens.
He might argue that scarce immigration resources could be better spent by hiring addi-
tional agents to patrol our borders than by providing food for detainees.” Id. at 874.
130. Id. at 873.
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rationale that the Constitution is applicable to everybody within the
United States’ territorial jurisdiction.131
Unfortunately, these arguments, while persuasive, are not bind-
ing. However, a 2018 case out of the D.C. Circuit, while similarly
nonbinding, has shown a radical departure from past precedent, and
may indicate a shift in the way the federal judiciary considers the
constitutional protections of minors detained at the border.
IV. GARZA V. HARGAN AND THE ASSUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROTECTIONS OVER NONCITIZENS DETAINED AT THE BORDER
In 2017, seventeen-year-old unaccompanied minor Jane Doe
was detained in an Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) facility in
Texas after attempting to enter the United States.132 Shortly there-
after, Doe discovered she was pregnant and sought an abortion while
in custody.133 ORR, under instruction that they were “prohibited from
taking any action that facilitates an abortion without direction and
approval from the Director of ORR,” refused to allow Doe to leave for
the procedure unless
a third party were to indicate a willingness to serve as a sponsor
for [Doe], qualify for that position under applicable legal require-
ments, complete the administrative review process, and obtain
ORR approval; or . . . if [Doe] were to voluntarily self-deport to
her home country, where Defendants conceded that abortion is
illegal.134
ORR also required that Doe “undergo counseling from a religiously
affiliated crisis pregnancy center,” view a sonogram, and notify Doe’s
mother, whom Doe alleged was abusive, of her decision.135 Rochelle
Garza, Doe’s guardian ad litem, subsequently filed a class action law-
suit requesting injunctive relief “on behalf of Doe and ‘all other
pregnant unaccompanied minors in ORR custody’ ” on the basis that
ORR’s practices violated the First and Fifth Amendments.136 In
October 2017, the District Court granted Doe a temporary restraining
131. Id. at 874–75. For further analysis of Justice Marshall’s dissent, see Alexandra
Dumezich, Development: Current Developments in the Judiciary: Garza v. Hargan, an
Undocumented Minor’s Right to an Abortion, 32 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 259.
132. Azar v. Garza, 138 S. Ct. 1790, 1791 (2018) (per curium).
133. Id.
134. Garza v. Hargan, 304 F. Supp. 3d 145, 150–51 (2018), aff’d in part, vacated in
part by J.D. v. Azar, 925 F.3d 1291 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
135. Id. at 151.
136. Id. at 153; Garza, 138 S. Ct. at 1791.
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order which was vacated by a panel of the D.C. Circuit Court of Ap-
peals two days later after their finding that the ORR policy was not
an undue burden on the minor seeking an abortion.137 Later that
week, the Court of Appeals reheard the case en banc and vacated
and remanded the panel order.138 After receiving an amended re-
straining order, Doe received an abortion and the government then
filed a petition for certiorari.139
In vacating the decision of the panel, Judge Millet highlighted
the fact that the government made no arguments whatsoever re-
garding Doe’s immigration or detention status potentially barring
her constitutional right to an abortion.140 Judge Millet noted:
What has also been expressly and deliberately uncontested by the
government throughout this litigation is that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment fully protects [Doe’s] right to
decide whether to continue or terminate her pregnancy. The
government—to its credit—has never argued or even suggested
that [Doe’s] status as an unaccompanied minor who entered the
United States without documentation reduces or eliminates her
constitutional right to an abortion in compliance with state law
requirements.141
The two dissents, most notably the one penned by current
Supreme Court Justice Brett Kavanaugh, vehemently argued that
Doe had no constitutional protections as a noncitizen who has not
effected entry into the United States.142 Justice Kavanaugh con-
tended that the majority’s decision was “based on a constitutional
principle as novel as it is wrong: a new right for unlawful immigrant
minors in U.S. Government detention to obtain immediate abortion
on demand.”143 Judge Millet questioned the reasoning in Justice
Kavanaugh’s dissent:
137. Garza, 138 S. Ct. at 1791–92 (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeaster Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992)).
138. Id. at 1792.
139. Id.
140. Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 737 (2017), vacated as moot, Azar v. Garza, 138
S. Ct. 1790 (2018) (Millet, J., concurring).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 743–56.
143. Id. at 752 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting). For further analysis of the case law sup-
porting Justice Kavanaugh’s position and for opposing arguments to those made by this
Note regarding the benefits that the ideas put forth in Garza may pose for unaccompanied
minors in immigration detention, see generally Kaytlin L. Roholt, Give Me Your Tired,
Your Poor, Your Pregnant: The Jurisprudence of Abortion Exceptionalism in Garza v.
Hargan, 5 TEX. A&M L. REV. 505 (2018).
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[I]t is unclear why undocumented status should change every-
thing. Surely the mere act of entry into the United States with-
out documentation does not mean that an immigrant’s body is no
longer her or his own. Nor can the sanction for unlawful entry be
forcing a child to have a baby. The bedrock protections of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause cannot be that shallow.”144
Unfortunately, we will never know if the powerful words of Judge
Millet’s opinion would have swayed the justices of the Supreme Court.
In June of 2018, after having granted the government’s petition for
certiorari, the Supreme Court vacated the en banc order for mootness
and remanded with instructions to dismiss the individual claim for
injunctive relief.145 While the decision therefore cannot be used as
precedent, ideally the position put forward by the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals is indicative of an upcoming shift in the federal judiciary’s
willingness to recognize the constitutional rights of immigrants de-
tained at the border upon seeking entry. Given the current political
climate, the appointment of justices like Brett Kavanaugh to the
Supreme Court, and the ongoing social outrage and growing media
coverage of the situation at our southern border, it is difficult to dis-
cern the likelihood of a successful constitutional challenge to immi-
gration policies. A change in the courts’ interpretation of immigrants’
constitutional rights along the lines of Garza, however, could have
positive implications for immigrant minors in federal custody. If the
courts begin assuming the constitutional standing of immigrants
detained at the border to bring claims under the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments, potential plaintiffs can instead focus on argu-
ing the fundamentality of the right they wish to protect rather than
whether or not they have any constitutional rights at all. In light of
this possible development, this Note will now examine what kind of
constitutional right could be asserted to challenge the statutory defi-
nition of an unaccompanied minor.
V. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE STATUTORY DEFINITION
OF UNACCOMPANIED MINOR AND ITS INTERPRETATION BY
THE GOVERNMENT
A. The Right to Family Unity: Moore v. East Cleveland
In 1977, Inez Moore challenged East Cleveland’s new housing
ordinance which limited the occupancy of a housing unit to members
144. Garza, 874 F.3d at 737–38.
145. Garza, 138 S. Ct. at 1793.
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of a strictly defined nuclear family.146 Moore was criminally charged
under this statute for allowing her grandson to reside with her after
the death of his mother.147 The Supreme Court noted that when the
government “undertakes such intrusive regulation of the family,”
the Court must carefully examine the government’s interest in re-
lation to the regulation.148 The freedom of “personal choice in mat-
ters of . . . family life” is a right long-recognized to be protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.149 The Court ul-
timately held that the city’s justifications were not strong enough to
survive the challenge to the invasive regulation on family unity by
arbitrarily limiting the definition to a nuclear family.150 In recogniz-
ing this substantive due process right, the Court looked to the “basic
values that underlie our society” regarding the “sanctity of the fam-
ily . . . deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”151 Ac-
cording to Justice Powell:
Ours is by no means a tradition limited to respect for the bonds
uniting the members of the nuclear family. The tradition of uncles,
aunts, cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household
along with parents and children has roots equally venerable and
equally deserving of constitutional recognition. Over the years
millions of our citizens have grown up in just such an environ-
ment, and most, surely, have profited from it . . . . Out of choice,
necessity, or a sense of family responsibility, it has been common
for close relatives to draw together and participate in the duties
and the satisfactions of a common home . . . . Especially in times
of adversity . . . the broader family has tended to come together for
mutual sustenance and to maintain or rebuild a secure home life.152
Thus, because of this heavily rooted tradition of extended family
unity in the household, the challenged regulation could not survive
strict scrutiny.153
146. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 496 n.2 (1977) (defining “family” as “[a]
[h]usband or wife . . . [u]nmarried children . . . provided, however, that such unmarried
children have no children residing with them . . . [or a] . . . father or mother of the
nominal head of the household . . .”).
147. Id. at 497.
148. See id. at 499.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 499–500. The city attempted to justify the regulation as “a means of pre-
venting overcrowding, minimizing traffic and parking congestion, and avoiding an undue
financial burden on East Cleveland’s school system.” Id.
151. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
152. Id. at 504–05.
153. Id. at 504–06.
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B. Does the Right to Family Unity Exist in Immigration
Detention?154
Unlike the constitutional challenges in Flores, the claim that
family separation violates immigrant children’s substantive due
process rights based on their unconstitutional classification as un-
accompanied minors has a higher chance of success given that the
right to family unity in certain contexts has been established by
past precedent.155 The right recognized in Moore is an offshoot of the
well-established and consistently acknowledged right to a “private
realm of family life which the state cannot enter” that has been
expanded to provide constitutional protections to extended families
in matters of the home.156 The question then becomes whether the
freedom to define family life as it relates to living arrangements is
equally applicable to family unity within immigration detention,
thereby requiring strict scrutiny as in Moor e.157
Clearly, living in a detention facility with restrictions on freedoms
such as liberty of movement is different from living in a residential
housing unit. However, the issue of the minors’ detention should not
strip them of this right to live with extended family. In the context of
prison visitation regulations, the Supreme Court has refused to elabo-
rate on whether imprisonment affects the “right to maintain certain
familial relationships” as “[an] inmate does not retain rights inconsis-
tent with proper incarceration.”158 However, most immigration deten-
tion is civil detention, not criminal incarceration.159 Following the
recent media investigations into the poor conditions at immigration
154. For the remainder of this Note, I will assume that the government, as in Garza,
will not challenge the constitutional standing of a class of accompanied unaccompanied
minors in immigration detention [hereinafter referred to as the class] to bring a claim
for the violation of their substantive due process rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 737 (2017).
155. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
156. See id. at 499.
157. See id.
158. See Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 131 (2003) (citing Moore v. East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494 (1977)). The Court instead focused on whether the regulations restricting
who could qualify as noncontact visitors violated the freedom of association. Id. The Court
held that the regulations sufficiently promoted legitimate penological goals, including the
promotion of internal security. Id. at 133–36.
159. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 864 (2018) (“The cases before us [in-
volving immigration detention during removal proceedings], however, are not criminal
cases . . . there are not many instances of civil confinement (aside from immigration
detention . . . .)”) (Breyer, J., dissenting); Arizona v. United States 567 U.S. 387, 396
(2012) (“Removal is a civil, not criminal, matter.”); Detention Management, U.S. IMMIGRA-
TIONS AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, https://www.ice.gov/detention-management [https://
perma.cc/6BUK-S4P6] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
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detention centers,160 ICE officials have even attempted to highlight
the allegedly nonpunitive and relaxed nature of these detention
centers.161 According to Matthew Albence, the head of enforcement
and removal operations for ICE, these family detention facilities are
akin to “summer camps.”162 Regardless of the reality of the prison-
like conditions of immigration detention,163 it would be a mistake to
infer, as in the criminal incarceration context, that minors in immi-
gration detention lose the right to live together with extended family
on the basis that their liberty of movement has been restricted
because of civil detention.
The Supreme Court in Flores feared the implications that ac-
knowledging a right to “freedom from physical restraint” would have
in other situations of government-backed juvenile custodial settings.164
Justice Scalia believed that a right to freedom from physical restraint
was not a fundamental right rooted in the consciousness of the Ameri-
can people.165 However, the class in this case would not be arguing
for a right to freedom from restraint or a similar right to release on
bail. Here, the class would allege a violation of the judicially recog-
nized right to freedom to live with extended family members.166 The
Moore Court extensively wrote about the fundamental and deeply
rooted nature of the right, stating that “[t]he tradition of uncles, aunts,
cousins, and especially grandparents sharing a household along with
parents and children has roots equally venerable and equally de-
serving of constitutional recognition.”167
It is likely that the Supreme Court would again punt the constitu-
tional questions under the guise that such a decision would intrude
upon the plenary power of the legislative branch in deciding matters
160. See, e.g., Dan Barry et al., Cleaning Toilets, Following Rules: A Migrant Child’s
Days in Detention, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/14/us
/migrant-children-shelters.html [https://perma.cc/276B-M783].
161. Meagan Vazquez, Top Immigration Official Says Family Detention Centers Are
‘Like Summer Camp,’ CNN (Aug. 1, 2018, 9:17 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/31/
politics/immigration-centers-summer-camp/index.html [https://perma.cc/26GB-7HGQ].
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Avery Anapol, Immigrant Teen Describes Conditions in Phoenix ICE
Detention Center, THE HILL (June 22, 2018, 3:58 PM), https://thehill.com/latino/393705
-immigrant-teen-describes-conditions-in-ice-detention-center [https://perma.cc/8AA3-YP
9B]; Kate Morrissey, Attorneys’ Report Slams Conditions for Migrant Children at U.S.
Detention Centers, L.A. TIMES (July 20, 2018, 8:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/local/la
now/la-me-border-children-20180720-story.html [https://perma.cc/QS87-L9UF]; Amy Taxin,
Immigrant Children Describe Treatment in Detention Centers, AP (July 18, 2018), https://
apnews.com/1a8db84a88a940049558b4c450dccc8a [https://perma.cc/G7VG-NHHG].
164. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302–03 (1993).
165. Id.
166. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504–06 (1977).
167. Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
2019] THE FIGHT AGAINST FAMILY SEPARATION 217
of admissibility.168 This is not a case of admissibility, though. On its
face, the challenge would be against the unnecessarily narrow statu-
tory classification of unaccompanied minors and its effect on the
right to family unity in the context of immigration detention.169 While
the classification of the minors in the class as accompanied could have
potential impacts on the family’s ultimate release on bail under a
proper application of the Flores Settlement’s requirements, at this
stage the class is not asking for a right related to admissibility.170
Should a court find that the statutory definition of unaccompa-
nied minor is an unconstitutional restriction on the right to family
unity, the government could attempt to rebut the challenge by
arguing that the statute is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.”171 In defense of the statute, the government may
argue that the language is tailored to prevent an increase in child
trafficking that could occur if all family units were placed in family
detention.172 Former Secretary Nielsen, in defense of family separa-
tion, has stated: “There have been cases where minors have been
used and trafficked by unrelated adults in an effort to avoid deten-
tion . . . . [I]n the last five months, we have a 314 percent increase
in adults and children arriving at the border, fraudulently claiming
to be a family unit.”173 CBP agents have similarly cited worrisome
statistics concerning instances of family fraud.174 Due to these
concerns, DHS has even begun testing a pilot program where immi-
grants suspected of family fraud are DNA tested at the border using
Rapid DNA technology.175 DHS has alleged that the “legal loopholes”
mandated by the Flores Settlement “act as a ‘pull factor’ for increased
future illegal immigration [and have] incited smugglers to place
children into the hands of adult strangers so they can pose as fami-
lies and be released from immigration custody after crossing the
border, creating another safety issue for these children.”176
168. Reno, 507 U.S. at 305; see also Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977).
169. See 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).
170. See discussion supra Section II.D; see also discussion infra Conclusion.
171. See Reno, 507 U.S. at 301–02.
172. See Blake, supra note 87.
173. See id.
174. Linda Qiu, Kirstjen Nielsen Justifies Family Separation by Pointing to Increase
in Fraud. But the Data is Very Limited., N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/06/18/us/politics/nielsen-family-separation-factcheck.html [https://perma
.cc/P3RD-GPSG].
175. Pricilla Alvarez & Geneva Sands, Exclusive: DHS to Start DNA Testing to Es-
tablish Family Relationships on the Border, CNN (May 1, 2019), https://www.cnn.com
/2019/04/30/politics/homeland-security-dna-testing-immigration/index.html [https://perma
.cc/K9C7-WNMW].
176. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Unaccompanied Alien Children and
Family Units Are Flooding the Border Because of Catch and Release Loopholes (Feb. 15,
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Yet these fears are unsupported by statistics. The over 300 per-
cent increase in family fraud cases cited by Secretary Nielsen in the
first five months of 2018 only account for about 0.6 percent of people
crossing the border, and the forty-six family fraud cases in the 2017
fiscal year accounted for just 0.06 percent of families apprehended
at the border.177 Deputy Chief Raul Ortiz of CBP conceded that of the
600 cases of alleged family fraud recorded in the agency’s Rio Grande
Valley sector, none of the cases involved “human trafficking, or the
illegal transportation of someone typically for sexual exploitation or
forced labor.”178 The officer continued to admit that most fraud cases
at the border involved the use of fraudulent documents where
“adults tr[ied] to pass as minors . . . [or] where someone who may be
a brother, cousin or neighbor identified themselves as a parent.”179
However, in light of the cultural circumstances from which these
nonparental family units have come, it is highly unlikely that these
instances of “fraud” are attempts to cheat the immigration system
that would be prevented by the government’s narrow definition of
unaccompanied minor.180 By labeling any familial relationship that
deviates from the strict, Western concept of the nuclear family as
fraudulent, the government is denying these people of their dignity
and their right to define family. The overwhelming majority of in-
dividuals apprehended by DHS are from Latin America,181 where the
cultural perceptions of family often include members of the extended
family such as “grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and even per-
sons who are neither related by blood nor affinity, such as godpar-
ents.”182 Under the current statute, each of these family members
would be legally separated from their minor relatives upon appre-
hension by DHS.183
Beyond the general cultural understanding of family, the unique
circumstances faced by families attempting to cross the border,
2018), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2018/02/15/unaccompanied-alien-children-and-family
-units-are-flooding-border-because-catch-and [https://perma.cc/5CZF-KF65].
177. Tim Stelloh, Experts Cast Doubt on DHS Claim that Traffickers are Posing as
Families at the Border, ABC NEWS (June 21, 2018, 5:22 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com
/storyline/immigration-border-crisis/experts-cast-doubt-dhs-claim-traffickers-are-posing
-families-border-n885241 [https://perma.cc/Q372-DXGP]; Qiu, supra note 174.
178. Stelloh, supra note 177.
179. Id.
180. See id.
181. Table 34, Aliens Apprehended By Region And Country Of Nationality: Fiscal
Years 2014 to 2016, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-sta
tistics/yearbook/2016/table34 [https://perma.cc/L9Y3-BFWN] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019).
182. See Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best: Quasi-
Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 908 (2003)
(citing studies indicating the prevalence of multigenerational households and the
importance of extended family in Latino communities).
183. 6 U.S.C. § 279(g)(2).
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particularly in asylum cases, may lead to the necessity of traveling
in nonparental family units.184 As immigration attorney Annaluisa
Padilla notes, the biological parents of these minors may have been
killed in their home country, and the children placed in the care of
other relatives as a result may see these relatives as their par-
ents.185 Padilla also acknowledges that the bureaucratic difficulties
these relatives may face when trying to formally adopt these chil-
dren could also prevent these relatives from becoming legal guard-
ians recognized by the statute.186 All of these challenges faced by
nonpare nt al family units arriving at the border echo the language
used in Moore to justify the fundamental nature of the right to ex-
tended family unity: “Especially in times of adversity . . . the broader
family has tended to come together for mutual sustenance and to
maintain or rebuild a secure home life.”187
Ultimately, there is little statistical evidence that the statutory
definition of unaccompanied minor is narrowly tailored to the com-
pelling government interest of deterring child trafficking or fraud
under a strict scrutiny review.188
Even if the right to family unity in the context of immigration
detention is not found to be a fundamental right deserving strict
scrutiny, there is still a chance that it can survive a more intermedi-
ate level of scrutiny similar to the right identified in Plyler.189 In
Plyler, while the right of undocumented minors to a public education
was not a fundamental right deriving from the substantive Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Constitution, the Supreme Court found that “[i]n
light of these countervailing costs [to the Nation and to the innocent
children who are its victims], the discrimination contained in § 21.031
can hardly be considered rational unless it furthers some substantial
goal of the State.”190 The Court settled on a level of scrutiny higher
than rational basis because of the severe and lifelong harm that dis-
crimination in public education would have on the affected children.191
Although the analysis performed in Plyler was pursuant to the
application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause
rather than the substantive Due Process Clause, it is worth noting
the Court’s willingness to grant a higher level of scrutiny than the
government argued was necessary due to the special circumstances
184. See Stelloh, supra note 177.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504–05 (1977) (emphasis added).
188. See supra text accompanying notes 177, 179.
189. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223–24 (1982).
190. Id. (emphasis added).
191. Id. at 221–24; see discussion supra Section III.A.2.
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of the class and the severity of the harm.192 The Court placed a great
amount of emphasis on the impact that this discrimination would
have on the children throughout the course of their lives.193 Thus, it
is a plausible argument that the separation of nonparental family
units according to the narrow statutory definition could likewise
lead to permanent physical and psychological harm to these minors,
and therefore the statute deserves a comparable level of intermedi-
ate scrutiny as given the challenged legislation in Plyler.
While the long-term effects of family separation in the context
of immigration detention have not yet been studied in depth, doctors
and psychologists can look to analogous studies of similar forms of
trauma to understand the possible impacts of family separation.194
Recent research has shown that children separated from their family
in immigration facilities may pose an increased risk of post-trau-
matic stress disorder (PTSD) and other lifelong psychological conse-
quences that remain even after family reunification.195 In past studies
of Latino children living in the United States with one or more parents
detained or deported, researchers determined that a statistically sig-
nificant amount of these children suffered from symptoms of PTSD
and other behavioral problems in school when compared to students
whose parents have had no contact with immigration enforcement.196
Importantly, psychologists have discovered that “subjecting young
children to an institutional environment [such as an orphanage] can
create irreversible changes in the brain” including “significantly
lower volumes of the prefrontal cortex . . . [which] would lead kids
192. Id. The Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause can often intertwine
in their identification and definition of a constitutional right. See Obergefell v. Hodges,
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–03 (2015) (“The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection
Clause connected in a profound way, though they set forth independent principles. . . .
[O]ne Clause may be thought to capture the essence of the right in a more accurate and
comprehensive way, even as the two Clauses may converge . . . .”).
193. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 223 (“The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of
their lives.”).
194. Heather Stringer, Psychologists Respond to a Mental Health Crisis at the Border,
AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, https://www.apa.org/news/apa/2018/border-family-separation [https://
perma.cc/S3Y4-FHS9] (last visited Nov. 4, 2019). Part of the difficulty in understanding
the consequences of forced family separation is due to the inhumane nature of the
practice of family separation itself. According to Megan Gunnar, the director of the Insti-
tute of Child Development at the University of Minnesota, “researchers are not allowed
to do to children what was being done to children at the border . . . . For the most part,
we are not even conducting experiments that force mother-infant separation on nonhuman
primates anymore.” Id.
195. Id.; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW ET AL., THE FLORES SETTLEMENT
AGREEMENT & UNACCOMPANIED CHILDREN IN FEDERAL CUSTODY 7 (2019), https://youth
law.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/Flores-Congressional-Briefing.pdf.
196. Stringer, supra note 194.
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to have trouble with executive functioning tasks, working memory,
inhibition control and cognitive flexibility.”197
The effects of family separation on children can also vary de-
pending on the age of the child. With younger children, family separa-
tion can lead to attachment issues and long-term emotional and
cognitive problems.198 Older, school-aged victims of family separa-
tion can often experience trouble in school and display regressive
behavior as well as symptoms of anxiety, depression, and other be-
havioral problems.199 The American Academy of Pediatrics, a vocal
opponent of family separation in immigration, has expressed con-
cern that the highly stressful experience of family separation “can
cause irreparable harm to lifelong development by disrupting a child’s
brain architecture,” and that this toxic stress can cause “detrimental
short- and long-term health effects” on children.200 Other health
organizations, such as the American Public Health Association, have
also criticized the practice, warning that family separation would
have “a dire impact on [the children’s] health, both now and into the
future,” and could lead to problems such as “alcoholism, substance
abuse, depression, obesity, and suicide.”201
Although the true extent of the mental and physical harms
resulting from family separation in immigration has yet to be fully
documented, it is clear that many health authorities reasonably
believe that it can have severely detrimental long-term health ef-
fects on children.202 Like the harm discussed in Plyler, the effects of
family separation on this innocent class of individuals are likely to
“mark them for the rest of their lives” and “[impose] a lifetime hard-
ship.”203 In defending the narrow statutory definition of unaccompa-
nied minors, the government should have to proffer a substantial
state interest that could justify the enormous, debilitating, and
197. Id.
198. Patty Huang, What Are the Long-Term Effects of Separating Immigrant Children




200. Devin Miller, AAP a Leading Voice Against Separating Children, Parents at
Border, AAP NEWS (June 14, 2018), http://www.aappublications.org/news/2018/06/14/wash
ington061418?utm_source=TrendMD&utm_medium=TrendMD&utm_campaign=AAP
News_TrendMD_0 [https://perma.cc/4EF8-78CX]; see also NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW ET
AL., supra note 195, at 7.
201. Kevin Kelleher, Doctors: Trump’s Border Separation Policy is Causing a ‘Mental
Health Crisis’ for Families, FORTUNE (June 16, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/06/15/doc
tors-trump-border-separation-policy-causing-mental-health-crisis-families/ [https://perma
.cc/JZD2-U5JF].
202. See id; NAT’L CTR. FOR YOUTH LAW ET AL., supra note 195, at 7.
203. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982).
222 WM. & MARY J. RACE, GENDER & SOC. JUST.              [Vol. 26:191
lifelong harm forced upon these children traveling in nonparental
family units.204
CONCLUSION: WHAT THE RIGHT TO FAMILY UNITY COULD
MEAN FOR FAMILY DETENTION AND SEPARATION
A judicially recognized fundamental right to family unity in
immigration detention could significantly impact how a nonparental
family unit makes their way through the immigration process. As
discussed in Sections II.C and II.D, the Flores Settlement stipula-
tions apply equally to minors accompanied by their parents and held
in family detention centers.205 Therefore, if nonparental family units
are now detained together instead of being separated pursuant to
§ 279(g)(2), they should also be held to the twenty-day standard limit
for detention in these non-licensed family detention facilities under
the federal court’s interpretation of the Flores Settlement.206 Because
of this standard, the government generally releases these families
on bail after the twenty days with instructions to appear in court at
a later date.207 Keeping nonparental family units together during
the immigration process could thus potentially allow these families
to remain together and prevent prolonged and indefinite detention.
The practice of releasing families together on bail with orders
to return to immigration court has proven to be a generally effective
method, with the majority of immigrants appearing on their desig-
nated court dates despite the Trump Administration’s arguments to
the contrary.208 If the government is concerned that allowing fami-
lies to remain together may lead to a massive exploitation of the
current immigration system, there are a number of more tailored
204. See id. at 230.
205. See supra Sections II.C and II.D.
206. See supra text accompanying note 80.
207. This practice has been referred to by the Trump Administration as “catch and
release.” See Lind & Scott, supra note 79.
208. In a recent speech to the American Farm Bureau Federation in 2019, President
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YEAR 2017 33–34 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/page/file/1107056/download [https://
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methods to addressing this issue than simply separating families
without cause or accountability.209 Under the current statute, the
government can continue to rip families apart legally and away from
the prying eyes of the media and organizations who wish to hold them
liable for their actions.210 Until the government is no longer able to
arbitrarily separate families pursuant to an oppressive and narrowly
written statute, these families will continue to fall through the cracks
of our justice system. These children may never again see their fam-
ilies, and ultimately, “[r]emember, we are talking about a child here.
A child who is alone in a foreign land.”211
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